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NOTE AND COMMENT 279
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-DSCRIMINATION-In
a recent decision,1 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the de-
cision of the New York Court of Appeals,2 which upheld a statute of the state
making it unlawful for anyone to knowingly attend a meeting of an oath-
bound organization which had not filed a copy of its constitution, oath, etc.,
with the secretary of state, but specifically exempting certain organizations
of the character named from the operation of the statute.
It was contended that the statute violated the equal protecion of laws
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute looks, at first blush, as
though it might so offend. It excepted from its operation labor unions and
"benevolent orders." a This included the Masonic Order, I. 0. 0, F., G. A. R.,
and K. of C., all named in the other statute. Plaintiffs in the present action
(habeas corpus proceedings) were members of the Ku Klux Klan. It will
be worth while to notice the basis upon which the legislature has been per-
mitted to classify.
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "Legislation may begin where the evil
begins."1% So, by necessary corollary, legislation may leave off where the
evil leaves off. When we are talking in terms of "classification," we are
talking in terms of groupings with reference to something of particular sig-
nificance for certain. purposes. The "classification" involved in the designa-
tion "oath bound organizations," is obviously a grouping or selection, as
the object of the legislation in question, with reference to the form and nature
of the organization. This is necessary as a convenient and expedient method
of identification and designation. There is no doctrine of Constitutional Law
nor any theory of policy of the common law that demands that any legislation
enacted for the purpose of regulating some of such organizations should be
equally applicable to all. Such is not the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The "legislation may begin where the evil begins," and here we find the
rationale of any further "classification." What the legislature in New York
has done in the statute involved in the principal ease is to proceed to a
further classification, making the statute applicable only to such organizations
as were responsible for the evil which the statute seeks to attack. Here, then,
we find the clue to the equal protection problem. We are to look to the
purpose of the act. It is obvious that this purpose is to afford protection
against organizations and associations, avowedly pledged to practices and
objectives inconsistant with our notions of law and government. Plaintiff
involved in the principal case was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, notorious
for its lawlessness and un-American character. The real question involved
is whether a statute aimed at curbing and regulating such associations is a
reasonable object of legislative solicitude and whether the alleged evils have
any basis in fact and experience. The proper method of solving such a
problem is obviously, to look to experience for the answer, and this is the
I People v. Zimmerman, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61 (1928). See post, p. 295.
for the facts in this ease.
2 People v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497, 43 A. L. R. 909.
$ N. Y. Laws, 1923, p. 1110, ch. 664; article 5-A, Civil Rights Law.
4 Holmes, dissenting, Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254,
42 Sup. Ct. 124.
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principle which has gradually emerged as the correct standard for the "equal
protection" guarantee.
Thus the court, in the principal case, quotes from Patsone v. Pennsyl-
vania.5  "The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. The
demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is sup-
posed to have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the
law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter
of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named."
Does the application of this principle help us in the present instance?
The activities of the Ku Klux Klan are no closed book, in spite of the secret
nature of the organization. Its long and shameful record of outlawry, crime,
defiance of law, intolerance and biggotry constitute one of the darkest chapters
in the history of American institutions. "The question is a practical one."
The law need not be applied equally to all members of the designated class,
for all members are not responsible for the evils which the statute aims to
correct. In this way, persons or objects may be selected from a class to form
what, in fact, constitutes another class, based upon the purpose and object
of the legislation in question. The fact that all but a few or even one member
of the larger designated class are excluded by the selection is no objection.
As said by Mr. Justice Holmes, "it is the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort." 8 But so long as the
sLattite is drafted upon experience which has a reasonable relation to a decent
end and objective, there can be nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn it. -Fowler V. Harper.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE CoMMERace-The state of Louisiana,
by legislative act, declared that the shrimp in the state were to be conserved
for the use of the people of the state; that under certain regulations one might
seeure a license to take the shrimp, to be canned within the state; that after
they were canned they might be shipped out of the state. Prior to the taking
effect of the act X, a Louisiana corporation, had been taking shrimp and
shipping them to Y, a Mississippi corporation, operating a canning factory
in Mississippi. The enforcement of the act would destroy this arrangement,
and make it impossible for 'T to can Louisiana shrimp, except in Louisiana.
X and Y, in the federal court in Louisiana, sought to, enjoin the enforcement
of parts of the act on the theory that they were invalid under the commerce
clause. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decree of the
lower courts which had refused a temporary injunction.1
It seems tc have been conceded that the plaintiffs could not have been
successful had they relied on the 14th amendment. In fact, there is no
dissent in the authorities on that score. The state owns the wild life of the
state for the benefit of its people; one can only then deal with this wild life,
(the property of the state) with the consent of the state. The state may grant
a license to take the game upon such conditions as it sees fit, but the licensee
acquires no property right protected by the "due process clause," for the
5 232 U. S. 138, 144, 58 L. Ed. 539, 34 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
6 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 207, 71 L. Ed. 1000, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1926).
1Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 49 Sup. Ct. 1 (Oct., 1928).
